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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3098 
___________ 
 
DARREN R. JONES, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JOHN BOYLE; WILLIAM RUETE; ROBERT GASPARAVIC, 
757 Page Ave. (E.T.D. Headquarters) Lyndhust, NJ 07071 
____________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-08-cv-03062) 
District Judge:  Honorable Katharine S. Hayden 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 22, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL, HARDIMAN AND ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 30, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
  Darren R. Jones appeals from the District Court’s entry of summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants.  We will affirm. 
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I. 
 From 1997 through 2007, Jones was employed as a delivery driver by Englewood 
Tire Distributors, Inc. (“ETD”), which was restructured during his employment as 
Englewood Tire Wholesale, Inc. (“ETW”).  He voluntarily resigned in 2007 and later 
filed suit pro se against ETW’s owner and two of its supervisory employees under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Jones alleges that defendants are Caucasian and paid 
him less than two co-workers (including another non-Caucasian) solely because he is 
African-American.  Discovery revealed that, while ETW paid Jones the same as or more 
than those two co-workers for most of his first six years of employment, it paid him 
between fifty cents and one dollar and fifty cents less an hour thereafter.  The parties do 
not dispute that point. 
 Defendants filed an initial motion for summary judgment, but the District Court 
later permitted Jones to amend his complaint to add ETD and ETW as defendants.  
Defendants then filed another motion for summary judgment, and Jones filed a motion 
for summary judgment as well.  The District Court granted defendants’ motion and 
denied Jones’s motion by order entered June 30, 2011.  Jones appeals.1 
                                                 
1
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review is plenary.  See Noel v. 
Boeing Co., 622 F.3d 266, 270 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010).  “Summary judgment is granted only if 
there remains no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Id.  “In order to demonstrate the existence of a genuine 
issue of material fact, the nonmovant must supply sufficient evidence (not mere 
allegations) for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant.”  Olson v. Gen. Elec. 
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II. 
 Jones’s claim is governed by the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  Under that framework, Jones 
bore the initial burden of making out a prima facie case by raising an inference of 
discrimination.  See Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation 
omitted).  The burden then shifted to ETW “to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for the adverse employment action.”  Id.  If it did so, then “the inference of 
discrimination drops and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the 
defendant’s proffered reason is merely pretext for intentional discrimination.”  Id. 
 In this case, the District Court assumed that the pay differential referenced above 
made out a prima facie case of discrimination.  It concluded, however, that ETW satisfied 
its burden of articulating a legitimate reason for the differential—i.e., that it was based on 
Jones’s performance, not his race.  In that regard, it noted that ETW had documented 
twenty-eight work-related problems over the years, only four of which Jones denied.  The 
District Court also concluded that Jones had presented no evidence that ETW’s 
explanation was pretextual.  The District Court noted the absence from the record of any 
disparaging or offensive remarks about Jones or African-Americans or any other 
                                                                                                                                                             
Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996).  The District Court granted summary 
judgment to the individual defendants because there is no individual employee liability 
under Title VII.  See Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002).  Because 
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evidence of discriminatory animus, and also noted that ETW had promoted another  
African-American employee to Assistant Supervisor during Jones’s tenure.  We have 
carefully reviewed the record, and we agree with the District Court on all counts.  Jones 
did not present any evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that ETW’s 
explanation for the pay differential was pretextual and that the differential was 
attributable instead to intentional discrimination.   
 Jones raises several arguments on appeal, but they lack merit.  First, he argues that 
ETW’s reliance on his performance issues is pretextual because it could have fired him 
on that basis but did not.  The mere fact that ETW did not fire Jones, however, does not 
call into question its stated reasons for taking the less drastic step of limiting his pay.  
Second, Jones argues that he was not required to show intent and appears to suggest that 
the pay differential was discriminatory per se.  That is not the law.  See Makky, 541 F.3d 
at 214.  Third, Jones argues that his performance issues were not a valid basis to pay him 
less because those issues arose infrequently when viewed over the ten-year term of his 
employment.  The question is not whether Jones’s performance warranted the pay 
differential in the abstract, however, but whether ETW’s stated reason was a pretext for 
discrimination.  Jones submitted no evidence from which a reasonable jury could 
conclude that it was.  Finally, Jones accuses ETW in conclusory fashion of committing 
                                                                                                                                                             
there is no room for dispute on that point, and because ETD was later restructured as TW, 
he remaining discussion will refer to ETW as the sole defendant. 
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perjury and withholding and manufacturing evidence.  Jones has not made any specific 
claim in this regard, let alone shown that there might be a basis for one. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
